Powers of Recall: Sigmund Freud’s Partiality for the Prehistoric

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I have made many sacrifices for my collection of Greek, Roman and Egyptian antiquities, and actually have read more archaeology than psychology.

Sigmund Freud, 1931.

Sigmund Freud's work continues to attract interest from philosophers, analysts and historians, and the earliest formulation of his theory of the unconscious and the 'seduction hypothesis' have recently received particular attention. While Freud's intellectual debt to such figures as Darwin, Nietzsche, Helmholtz and Brücke has been well documented, the influence of Heinrich Schliemann on him and his work is little known. The purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which Schliemann's work helped Freud fashion himself as an 'archaeologist of the mind' and how, in the crucial year 1896, it enabled him to construct and present his new ideas. The paper also explores Freud's interest in collecting and suggests how and why Freud's debts to archaeology are not, as commonly thought, visible in the so-called 'archaeological metaphor of mind', but present in other areas of his life and writing.

Do we all live in a False Memory Society? Therapists are claiming the power to recover memories of childhood sexual abuse, even of Satanic possession, from thousands of anxious adults. But critics now allege that such powers are founded on deceit: far from restoring repressed memories of trauma, they charge, self professed healers are implanting in susceptible patients false recollections of events that never took place. Therapists are being sued by families destroyed by specious allegations of abuse, and the authors of a popular 'memory recovery programme' are under attack for violating memory's rights. Meanwhile newly-founded organisations with such baleful names as the False Memory Syndrome Foundation and the British False Memory Society accuse therapists of a sinister form of mind control.1

These events of the present are one of the reasons for this article about the past. To the historian of psychoanalysis, they have a distinctly familiar feel. Since its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, psychoanalysis has viewed memory as one of the most vexing of mental operations, elusive though apparently accessible.2 In its recognition of the persistence and the mysteries of memory, psychoanalysis was born as a theory, while the possibility of retrieving and revising memory made psychoanalysis viable as a practice. Were Freud and his colleagues founding members of the False Memory Society? What might the links be between theories of memory and the establishment of psychoanalysis as an historical science or, more properly, what William Whewell dubbed the palaeological sciences? These are impossibly large questions, the kind only a man with Whewell's legendary intellectual stride might attempt. Things become more manageable if we limit ourselves to the particular efforts Freud made to retrieve and repair the memories of those neurotics who consulted him in fin-de-siécle Vienna. As it happens, during the years that Freud was launching psychoanalysis he was also pursuing what would quickly become a consuming interest in history. In the space of a few months in 1896, Freud developed his radical 'seduction theory' of hysteria, began a collection of antiquities, and became fascinated with archaeology. The past, the artefacts of the past and the excavation of the past were central to Freud's intellectual concerns as he grappled with the puzzling features of memory. What connected these themes and the early formulations of psychoanalytic therapeutics?

An article about a historical subject using history risks becoming hopelessly refracted and even impenetrable. Collective, historical memory is no less elusive than individual memory; every historian has had the baffling experience of learning that apparently reliable artefacts and experiences retrieved from the past are actually modern-day impositions on the record. Every historian has witnessed supposedly hard facts slip away like soap in the bath. Such problems are most severe for historians of psychoanalysis, whose research is hampered for historians of psychoanalysis, whose research is hampered by primary source material (the guardians of Freud's papers are notoriously restrictive) coupled with an over-abundance of secondary literature on Freud, which has been described lately as 'vast, rapidly growing, almost out of control'.3

Then there is the profession of psychoanalysis to contend with. Guarded and territorial, and exuding an air of impregnability, psychoanalysts have become adept at deflecting and undermining their critics. Freud was wont to dismiss all objections to analysis as the irrational mauderings of weak minds, minds not ready for the threatening theory of sexual drives and the chastening hypothesis of unconscious motivation.4 Nowadays, the objections are different but no less vocal and volatile: only the foolish, the wise or the brave venture forth. 'Surely you're not relying on Strachey's translation the only alternatives to the aimless accumulation of weak minds, minds not ready for the threatening theory of sexual drives and the chastening hypothesis of unconscious motivation.4 Nowadays, the objections are different but no less vocal and volatile: only the foolish, the wise or the brave venture forth. 'Surely you're not relying on Strachey's thoroughly unreliable English translation of Freud?', they say. 'You are aware of course of Freud's letters to Edoardo Weiss, are you not?' they add. The work you rely on by Jeffrey Masson/Adolf Grünbaum/Josef Sajner/Karl Eissler (etc, etc) has, as you know, been subject to searching criticism in several journals'. And, naturally, those who have not been analysed cannot speak with full knowledge about the subject...

With academic muggers lurking on every corner, it is not surprising that many historians take on the protective colouration of what Gore Vidal has recently deposed as 'squirrel scholarship'.5 But are hagiography and sour denunciation the only alternatives to the aimless accumulation of...
How did Freud interpret his vice? He recognised well enough its threats to health and suffered them keenly, eventually fatally. But his willingness to trade momentary pleasure for lasting pain suggests that smoking may have held deeper claims on him. Or was it perhaps deliberate risk-taking? Fear, pain, love, all the emotions hurt more or less, so why not choose a poison? Richard Klein has suggested, with surprising plausibility, that cigarettes and cigars tell us the only significant story there is to tell about a smoker’s life, that they offer a kind of Kantian negative pleasure, that they are good, beautiful — Klein’s word is sublime — because they are bad. The pleasure being painful, being guaranteed rather than qualified by pain, smoking gives us a foretaste of immortality, an inkling of eternity. To smoke is a kind of loving and mourning, a form of spiritual meditation, a ‘sort of mandala spun at the end of the fingertips — a discipline of breathing, as well as a sacrament consumed’. Plausible, perhaps, but few readers would venture so far, I think. To the point are Sander Gilman’s very interesting and focused thoughts on the associations between Freud’s habit and his sense of identity as a Jew (death and eternity appear once again in the equation, as we might expect). 

Freud would, I think, have found such speculations fanciful. His own account of his cigar lust is certainly disappointing. Those long, phallic objects, carefully pulled from their box, sniffed and fondled before being bitten, then licked, sucked and twisted in the mouth like a malodorous teat ... To Freud, they were perfectly innocuous. Or, perhaps not perfectly. In a couple of passages Freud intimates another interpretation altogether. During a period of self-enforced sexual abstinence, Freud confided to Fleiss that his need to smoke was his ‘libido’; later he described being without a cigar as tantamount to self-mutilation. Freud takes us no further down this particular ‘royal road’ than these tantalising hints, leaving it to vaudeville to find facile hilarity in the resemblance of cigar to phallus and smoking to self-abuse. Far from seeing cigars as the butt of humour, Freud perceived them as Arbeitsmittel, the ‘stuff of work’. To Freud, cigars were a means of staying at the workbench, a kind of labour-saving, energy-prolonging, stamina-enhancing device in his mental kitchen. Perhaps he thought that it was not the cook’s obligation to explain his own dishes.

FREUD'S SMOKESCREEN

Freud’s best-known ‘partiality’ was to smoking, which he called his ‘first addiction’. An addiction it certainly was. Try as he did to stub out the habit, on the urging first of his confidant Wilhelm Fliess and then of his physician, Freud could never endure the prohibition for long. Not for him the puritan route he described being without a cigar as tantamount to self-abuse. Far from seeing cigars as the butt of humour, Freud perceived them as Arbeitsmittel, the ‘stuff of work’. To Freud, cigars were a means of staying at the workbench, a kind of labour-saving, energy-prolonging, stamina-enhancing device in his mental kitchen. Perhaps he thought that it was not the cook’s obligation to explain his own dishes.

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**FEUD'S OTHER ADDICTION**

But enough of cigars. My concern is Freud's second addiction, or what he called his 'second partiality'. This proclivity, for ancient history and archaeology, played a far greater role than did cigars in Freud's intellectual and emotional development. The comparison with smoking is worth pursuing, however, since Freud's partiality for archaeological and antique objects has not received the same attention as his smoking, or, for that matter, such trivial parts of his life as his love of pets, dislike of the telephone, and contempt for Hollywood. Look at some of the many portraits of Freud 'with Cigar' and the background often resolves into a mass of curious objects, arranged in lines and ranks. This is Freud's army, an enormous collection of antique statues, bowls, pots and figurines. Unaccountably, Freud's archaeological and collecting interests were until recently not subject to historical scrutiny; it is remarkable that the 200-page index of Freud's works in English has no entry for 'Archaeology', squashed as we might expect it to be between 'Arabs, meaning of meal in common' and 'Arithmomania', which might suggest that the term does not appear in the works. Until the recent appearance of a catalogue of some of the antiquities, accompanied by a clutch of interpretative essays, no reliable information has been available on Freud's collection, and there remain many uncertainties in the historical record.

The extent of Freud's archaeological collection is likely to surprise and impress readers. Anyone visiting Freud in his consulting rooms in Vienna (or at his London home, now the Freud Museum) would immediately have recognised Freud's lusty enthusiasm for historical and prehistorical objects. His rooms (but, interestingly, not his living quarters) were veritable treasure-houses of antique relics. Paintings and bas-reliefs displayed in cabinets and over every available surface, colonising Freud's otherwise orderly desk (Fig. 2). [Not] a doctor's office, but rather an archaeologist's study' was how Freud's famous patient 'the Wolf Man' described the consulting room, as photographs bear witness.

**Fig. 2: Looking into Freud's study, through a doorway in his Vienna consulting room, 1938.**

Sometimes, it is said, a cigar is just a cigar. Might Freud's antiques have been merely decorative? The size and contents of Freud's collection and his diligent collecting make this unlikely. Freud amassed over two thousand objects (more than the number of books in his library) and did so with zeal and devotion. Only genuine artefacts interested him and his sometimes twice-weekly visits to Viennese dealers were augmented with authenticity checks of his own. Like other devoted collectors, Freud was willing to make sacrifices to preserve and enlarge his collection: even as he complained of 'the constantly recurring difficulty of obtaining cash for daily living', he put money aside for purchases. When he stayed in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome and New York, Freud visited archaeological museums; the highlights of his visits to London were trips to the British Museum, and he spent several evenings studying specialised, technical literature in preparation for each visit. That his investment in collecting was deep-seated is suggested by that curious account in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) of an occasion when, strolling through a foreign city, Freud's lust for antiques became all-consuming: every shop seemed to beckon him with a sign reading 'Antiquities'. Freud's nagging, sometimes desperate, fear of being parted from his objects also suggests an addiction; some of his most anxious moments at the hands of the Nazi authorities occurred not when his own future was imperilled but when the fate of his collection hung in the balance. Much to his surprise the authorities, satisfied that Freud's papers were in order and that he was *unbedenklich* or 'innocuous', released him and his collection, on which they imposed a minimal levy of around 150 dollars.

There is little that is innocuous about Freud's second partiality. On the contrary, it raises several interesting questions, which we must consider before turning to Freud's fascination with archaeology. We need to ask whether collecting was (and is) a kind of addiction (for Freud was an addicted collector). And we need to discover what sort of people it lured (and lures). Given the importance of collecting in other nineteenth-century disciplines, such as botany and geology, addressing such questions is likely to yield insights into shared disciplinary contexts and into tricky questions of motivation and reward — that is, why individuals have pursued certain disciplines and what benefits they have derived.

**FEUD'S COLLECTING**

Collecting (which needs to be distinguished from collections), in its historical, intellectual and emotional manifestations, has received remarkably little study (although with Balzac's *Cousin Pons*, John Fowles' *The Collector* and, recently, David Benedictus' *The Stamp Collector*, we have access to some wonderfully melodramatic fictional accounts of the frenetic obsession). Is this perhaps because collecting seems so common and innocent a pursuit? A childish passion like hoarding Jerusalem or mumming postage stamps to book? But it is the very childishness of collecting, coupled with recognition that the child inhabits the man, that has drawn psychoanalysts to collecting, and led figures as renowned as Ernest Jones, Karl Abraham, Otto Fenichel and Sandor Ferenzci to write about it. In his own pioneering essay 'Character and Anal Eroticism' (1908) Freud approaches collecting via his study of the 'anal character', who displays three linked characteristics: parsimony, orderliness and obstinacy. Freud speculates that anal characters experienced early difficulties in toilet training and anal eroticism, later repressed or sublimated into more socially acceptable avenues such as collecting, hoarding, and saving. Such connections are drawn from theory, case histories, and analyses of dreams, slips of the tongue and memories. Freud's account of the anal character has stood up remarkably well to clinical testing and has been validated in several reputable non-psychoanalytic studies. Detailed discussion is impossible here, but significant correlations among the traits of orderliness, stinginess and stubbornness may prove valuable to historians and biographers. 'Personality triangulation' of this kind enables one to infer the existence of one trait, such as stinginess, from the demonstrated existence of the other two.

But all this, valid or not, relies on the supposition that collecting is a useful descriptive category in the first place. What, in fact, is collecting? It involves two related but distinguishable activities: the acquisition and accumulation of objects, followed by their ordering. The collector organises objects according to specific notions of classification and categorisation, notions that may be formal or informal and that
may be of considerable cultural and even psychological interest.29 William James, in a brief but characteristically lucid passage in his Principles of Psychology (1890), attacks associationist accounts of collecting that claim to offer a single key to all collectors. James argues that there are innumerable kinds of collector (and collecting), from those who enjoy the pleasure of the chase to those searching for inviolable possession, from those anxious for command over objects to those willingly enslaved to them.30

What kind of collector was Freud? What pattern, if any, does his collecting fit? Was he the Don Juan of Wilhelm Stekel's studies, the lustful collector for whom every acquisition is a sexual conquest for his harem?31 Or was the hoarder portrayed in Balzac's Cousin Pons, driven by some inner compulsion to accumulate, it matters not what? Was Freud in pursuit of the rarest or costliest object, impelled by a passion for eminence through possession, like the famed bibliophiles Sir Thomas Phillipps and Thomas Layton?32 Perhaps Freud's collecting only seems aimless and excessive, like the insatiable mushroom-gathering of A.A. Brill's recently-widowed patient, who turns out on analysis to be driven by penis envy?33 Or was Freud closer to Samuel Pepys, whose acquisitiveness, it is said, was the fruit of an obsession for order so great that every book in his immense library was arranged systematically by size such that even the tops of rows of books were level, no volume raising its ugly head a fraction of an inch above the others?34 Was Freud perhaps, in our modern-day parlance, a status seeker, using the display of goods in his rooms to impress visitors, thereby presenting a particular (successful, bourgeois, etc.) self?35

Freud was, so far as one can establish, like none of these collectors. Far from hoarding, he took considerable pleasure in giving items from his collection as gifts; he gave engraved Greek gems (to be set in rings) to seven of his close collaborators (the 'Seven Rings').36 Although Freud took care in arranging his collection, it had no fixed order; nor is it evident that it served a lust for power, riches, glory or sexual conquest. Although our information about the collection is partial, the subject of Freud's collection rather than the activity of collecting appears to provide insight into Freud's motives and rewards.37 The collection was built up primarily to satisfy his interest in archaeology and prehistory, and only secondarily to nourish the impulse to collect, hoard and possess things. And although Freud sometimes fell prey to nostalgia, his yearning for the past never led him to reject the present as a habitable world, as did those benighted sufferers of maladies de la mémoire that so concerned nineteenth-century neurologists.38

The objects Freud prized were classical or pre-classical, and largely of Mediterranean origin (Figs. 3-6). This provenance was the fruit of an obsession for order so great that every book in his immense library was arranged systematically by size such that even the tops of rows of books were level, no volume raising its ugly head a fraction of an inch above the others?

Freud explored the link between Judaism and Egypt in detail in Moses and Monotheism (1939), which traces Judaism to Egypt, speculates that Moses was an Egyptian and not Hebrew, and argues that Jewish monotheism was derived from that of
Akhenaten (or Ikhnaton). Freud’s book was written forty years after his father’s death, in the wake of the much-publicised discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun in 1922. Nevertheless, Freud first began forging connections between Jewish and Egyptian history in the mid-1890s; he remarked to a correspondent, for instance, that the portrait of an Egyptian female mummy on his wall had ‘a nice Jewish face’. Collecting and recollecting the past offered Freud a new family lineage, but a complex and contradictory one. In giving priority to Egypt in the story of monotheism and in his own collections, was Freud perhaps denying his own father and his Judaism (or, more specifically, belittling the patriarchs) enacting his own version of the family romance?

In a letter to Ferenczi in 1914, Freud spoke of his radical scientific theories and the death of his father having driven him in 1896 to ‘the peak of loneliness, [I] had lost all my old friends and hadn’t acquired any new ones; no one paid any attention to me.’ Several recent historians have cast doubt on this self-assessment and Frank Sulloway sees it as part of Freud’s construction of a heroic mythology of self to sustain his own originality and courage to speak out against opposition. Sulloway correctly notes that in the years following the appearance of his major work The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud was less isolated than he was prone to claim; Sulloway also shows that no conspiracy of opposition (or, for that matter, of silence) greeted the book. But turn the clock back a few years and a different picture emerges; Freud never
forgot his isolation in the last years of the nineteenth century; as late as 1941, he recalled how 'in the year 1895... I felt as though I were despised and universally shunned' 56 Not sufficient to break Freud’s spirit, despite Masson’s tendential claims, the isolation was nevertheless a reality. 57 Indeed, it was the most powerful of all realities, partially self-imposed and thoroughly lived through.58 The evidence is quite clear: Freud believed himself from 1895 onwards to be intellectually isolated and besieged, whether or not he overestimated his isolation. As anyone will know who has ever felt alone in a crowd, isolation is in the mind of the sufferer. 59

That Freud may have immersed himself in archaeology to escape intellectual and emotional isolation runs up against - or, rather, avoids - an obvious obstacle; this is what might be called the naturalistic or common-sense explanation of his interest in the past. Freud became interested in archaeology, this argument might run, because psychoanalysis is like archaeology. This objection is worth considering, since it leads us to the heart of Freud’s engagement with the subject.

FREUD’S ‘MASTER METAPHOR’

‘[The] psychoanalyst, like the archaeologist in his excavations’, Freud once told the Wolf Man, ‘must uncover layer after layer of the patient’s psyche, before coming to the deepest, most valuable treasures’. 60 To another patient, the Rat Man, Freud explained that everything conscious is in the process of wearing away, but that the unconscious is relatively permanent; indeed, its contents had been preserved by being buried. Freud illustrated his remarks by pointing to the objects in his own collection.61 Such passages as these have established the kinship of psychoanalysis and archaeology through what Gay has recently dubbed Freud’s ‘master metaphor’.62 What sort of metaphor is this? Does it suggest some natural links between the concerns of archaeology and psychoanalysis?

In 1817 Coleridge railed against ‘certain...similes and examples’ that had been rendered meaningless by over-use. ‘Suiting equally well with too many subjects’, he wrote, they convey nothing save slack imagination and should be placed on a kind of index expurgatorius. 63 Freud’s is a depth metaphor, and such metaphors as buried knowledge, emotional strata and layered experience had become clichés by the late nineteenth century. Countless verses, dramas and novels had explored the disjunction between reality and appearance, those subterranean streams, mines and caverns where the private self is at odds with the public life of achievement.64 What else is the Victorian novel but a three-decker study of how all is not what it seems? And where would the proponents of psychoanalysis look, if not to ‘depth’ sciences, for analogies to their own archaeology.65 Freud’s is a depth metaphor, and such metaphors as buried knowledge, emotional strata and layered experience had become clichés by the late nineteenth century. Countless verses, dramas and novels had explored the disjunction between reality and appearance, those subterranean streams, mines and caverns where the private self is at odds with the public life of achievement.64 What else is the Victorian novel but a three-decker study of how all is not what it seems? And where would the proponents of psychoanalysis look, if not to ‘depth’ sciences, for analogies to their own psychological excavations? In fact, so familiar was the depth metaphor by Freud’s day that it conjured nothing particularly archaeological. Any of a host of new pursuits, scientific and practical, such as geology, vulcanology and mining, would have served equally well, for each is concerned with processes of erosion and burial, followed by uncovering and retrieval. Not only had Freud available to him a rich German literature of Romanticism which found metaphors for truths hidden in the depths of the earth, but from such classics as the Odyssey, the Aeneid and the Divine Comedy he could recover some of the narratives of the Orphic journey into the underground as a route to self-knowledge.65 Besides, other forms of intellectual enquiry also claimed parallels with archaeology; Freud's fictional contemporary Sherlock Holmes saw detective investigation as archaeological work. 66 Freud’s metaphor would seem on the face of it to be ripe for Coleridge’s interdiction. But perhaps it had some archaeological depth of its own.

Analysing a metaphor is a tiresome venture, rather like dissecting jokes. Both are fragile, and intended for short-lived effect. But we cannot avoid asking what use a metaphor or analogy might be in science. The question has prompted several studies, and following the careful work of Mary Hesse, in which metaphor and analogy are shown to be not embellishments but instead essential ingredients in science, many commentators have attended to the constitutive role of such figures of speech in fields as varied as molecular biology, particle physics and medicine. 67 In his recent study of rhetoric in science, Alan Gross makes the point that analogy has a heuristic role in science, helping to uncover the operations in one realm using procedures familiar from another.68 The point is rather prescriptive than descriptive, for several scientists have used analogy and metaphor not only in a heuristic but also a probative role, seeing them as a means of establishing truths, of discovering connections that are not provisional but permanent, of finding what Darwin (whose use of analogy and metaphor is extensive) termed ‘true affinities’. 69 As Robert Young has shown, the analogy with which the Origin of Species opens, between artificial and natural breeding, and thence between artificial and natural selection, is crucial to Darwin not only in establishing his argument but also in the exposition and reception of the theory. 70 Might a similar role be played by Freud’s figure of speech?

What kind of metaphor is Freud’s? By evoking one or more familiar images, a well-chosen analogy or metaphor can help us understand something new or complicated. In its ‘master’ version, Freud’s metaphor may perhaps seem a useful way of illuminating the human mind and memory, and it still appears to have currency amongst modern psychoanalysts. 71 And why not, since the metaphor would seem to provide what Steen Larsen, in an attempt to modernise it, has called “clear, practical guidelines for carrying out ‘memory excavation’”.72 But the metaphor is flawed, and fatally, in several respects, both for what it implies and for what it fails to imply. As Spence has pointed out, memories are not, as the archaeological metaphor supposes, immutable and isolated but are being changed continually both by the influence of later events and by being recollected in language, a process which can distort and drastically transform memories. Moreover, there are many crucial aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice which cannot be accounted for if the archaeological metaphor is accepted. What possible archaeological equivalents might there be for such cardinal notions as resistance, transference and free association? Nor is anything useful gained by pointing out that memories and desires are buried like objects, since mental cover-ups are uniquely determinate, compelling and explicable. Moreover, the nature of the analyst’s relationship to the past differs from that of the archaeologist: to Freud, a patient’s past was laden with pejorative associations, a kind of incubus on the present lives of neurotics unable to break free from the past.73 But the archaeologist can hardly be said to combat what he digs up. The more carefully one looks, the more absurd Freud’s metaphorical conceit appears.

How can we account for the use of such a weary metaphor in a body of writing otherwise so fluent and brilliant (Freud won the Goethe Prize in 1930 for literary excellence)? The answer, I think, is that commentators have mistakenly cited the casual, almost neutral, versions of Freud’s metaphor in his twentieth-century writings and missed completely its earlier highly-charged appearances. Freud first formulated this archaological metaphor for a particular purpose, as would any literary craftsman. But as his own theories changed, the use that could be made of a formative metaphor diminished greatly. Perhaps he ought to have ditched it. Perhaps he ought to have ditched his earlier theories, too. In fact he did neither: both were merely pushed aside. The strong and passionate metaphor he devised in the mid-1890s had become a feeble echo. 74 None of this belittles the role of metaphor, but rather the reverse. What follows from my account is that metaphor, like analogy, is not an aid to the establishment of a theory but constitutive of it, and which cannot be ‘removed or forgotten’ without decisive effects for the theory itself.75
Freud's first reference to archaeology appears in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895, written with Josef Breuer), where he describes his procedure for curing a patient as 'clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer'. He adds that 'We liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city'. The analogy is not refined. It is further muddled at the end of the study where Freud compares his treatment to a surgical operation, ‘opening up of a cavity filled with pus, the scraping out of a carious region, etc. ’. In both cases, the burden of the analogy is to suggest that Freud’s operation is not the cure but only the beginning of the cure, like removing archaeological and surgical obstacles. The analogy here facilitates comprehension neither of psychoanalysis’ method nor of the cure, and Freud seems not to have considered the consequences of his analogy.

A year later, in 1896, Freud uses his archaeological metaphor for the first time in public. As we have seen, the year is a crucial one for Freud, the year, not coincidentally in which he first coins the term ‘psychoanalysis’.7 We find Freud on 21 April delivering a key lecture on his radical theory of the sexual aetiology of hysteria before his medical colleagues in Vienna. He expects a hostile audience and devotes considerable time to anticipating likely objections.7 It is in the context of a focus on his methodology that he introduces his comparison of archaeology and psychoanalysis. The power of a metaphor or analogy in such circumstances lies in its reassuring and legitimising properties. By linking an established science to one still lacking its own settled theory, practice and vocabulary, Freud’s metaphor serves as an orienting device. Freud, that master of ‘making it up as he went along’ (as Adam Phillips has well described him), used the archaeological metaphor in a masterly way to legitimise an unconventional science.79

Imagine, Freud says, that an archaeologist is exploring a new site. He may be content to inspect what is visible, quiz local inhabitants for their folk knowledge, and proceed merrily on his way. Alternatively, he ‘may have brought picks, shovels and spades with him... and he may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried’.80 It is this second approach that Freud recommends. It sounds like a blunt and violent way to probe the earth, and a *fortiori* the minds of hysterics, but what matters is not the instrument but the results of excavation. First dugged to the surface, then subjected to interpretation, the archaic remnants of the individual’s past speak to the analyst as buried artefacts speak to the archaeologist.81 Freud is adamant here that analysis is work, a wrench begun once the patient’s stories comes later: at this stage, the work is on the therapist’s part, not the patient’s). Though later versions of the archaeological metaphor would suggest otherwise, he declares himself to be as ‘neutral’ toward memory artefacts as any archaeologist would be towards physical artefacts.

By his own testimony, Freud’s lecture was given an icy reception; the meeting’s chairman, Richard Krafft-Ebing, described what he had heard as a ‘scientific fairy tale’. Krafft-Ebing’s objections are not recorded, but it is likely that he was shocked not by the sexual content of Freud’s theories (he did pioneering research into human sexuality himself) but rather by the results—a physiological theory of hysteria. Saxa loquentur!82 Freud is adamant here that analysis is work, a wrench begun once memories are drawn up from the unconscious (the analyst’s withdrawal from the couch and hovering attention to the patient’s stories comes later: at this stage, the work is on the therapist’s part, not the patient’s). Though later versions of the archaeological metaphor would suggest otherwise, he declares himself to be as ‘neutral’ toward memory artefacts as any archaeologist would be towards physical artefacts.

What emerges clearly from Freud’s writings is that he came to recognise the limited, merely ‘figurative’ nature of metaphor and its deceiving power to lure the unweary into reifying its categories.91 Interestingly, Josef Breuer had issued just such a warning in 1895, in his contribution to *Studies on Hysteria*. ‘All our thinking tends to be accompanied and aided by spatial ideas, and we talk in spatial metaphors’, Breuer wrote, adding that the metaphorical can easily take on the character of the real, and ‘a building with its dark underground cellars’ come to serve as more than a metaphor and produce a deceptive ‘mythology’.92 By 1900, Freud was making the same point himself (and using a metaphor to do so). In *The Interpretation of Dreams* he wrote: ‘We are justified, in my view, in giving free rein to our speculations so long as we retain the coolness of our judgement and do not mistake the scaffolding for the building.’93

In a little-noticed passage, Freud would subsequently signal his abandonment of the by-now-exhausted archaeological metaphor. In *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), Freud invites his readers on what he calls ‘a flight of imagination’. Suppose, he writes, that ‘Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past’. Freud no sooner introduces the analogy than he concedes its fundamental flaws. Whereas parts of Rome have been obliterated, no part of a mind is lost forever. For the analogy to have any value, all the stages of the city’s development would have to coexist alongside one another, a ‘phantasy’ that Freud describes as ‘unimaginable and even absurd’.84 The essential spatio-temporal structure of the mind has no parallels in archaeological loss and preservation.85
FREUD AND SCHLIEMANN

Freud's archaeological reference-point in 1896 was the celebrated work of Heinrich Schliemann, whose archaeological discoveries, including the Homeric site of Troy, were the most spectacular of the century. Schliemann's unerring gift for self-promotion had ensured that his reputation survived his death in 1890.94 Freud was fast developing an intense interest in archaeology and an unreserved admiration for Schliemann's excavations, writings and personality, an admiration noted but little studied by scholars.95 His library contained at least three of Schliemann's major works, in German (Schliemann wrote in over a dozen languages and published books in English, German and French): 

Mykenae (1878), Ilios (1881) and Tiryns (1886).96 One need not look far to find in such texts the origin of Freud's results-oriented interpretation of scientific method. Schliemann never ceased touting his own scientific credentials, despite a reputation for working unmethodically.97 Many charged him with blatant disregard for the fragility and finiteness of sites; Schliemann worked with legions of workers bearing picks, shovels and other crude instruments. Max Müller was quick to say that Schliemann discovered Troy — and destroyed it for the last time.98 But Schliemann had his defenders, among them the eminent pathologist and archaeological enthusiast Rudolf Virchow. In Ilios, Freud would have found Virchow's defense of Schliemann's results-are-all approach: 'If his work is crowned with success,' Virchow wrote, 'the discoveries are self-explanatory.'99 Uttered at a time when archaeology was maturing as a science, shaking off its earlier associations with antiquarianism and amateurism, Virchow's defense was a forceful one, and to many, a convincing strategy. One can see why Freud would have latched onto it.

'Self-explanatory' is an odd epithet to apply to Schliemann's discoveries. No archaeologist, surely, took greater interpretative risks than Schliemann (in a field bedevilled by interpretive timidity) and none was more willing to read cultures, lifestyles and beliefs into traces of evidence recovered from the earth.100 It was Schliemann who recognised the cardinal importance of fragmentary evidence, who, when others attended only to statues and inscriptions as signifiers, dutifully preserved and interpreted apparently insignificant fragments and what he termed 'excrescences'.101 'The more barbaraously wrought some of his objects were', Sir Arthur Evans noted in 1931, 'the more they seemed to please him.'102 Finding beauty and meaning in what others dismissed as 'rubbish' laid Schliemann open to attack, especially since his interpretations appeared quixotic.103 But Schliemann's hermeneutics was organised around several themes.

Consider Figure 8, an image from Schliemann's Ilios, one of dozens of similar objects illustrated in his published books and reports. Schliemann's colleagues were inclined to dismiss such artefacts as trivial, but he insisted that it is representational, the figure of an idol, which, supported by etymological histories, Schliemann open to attack, especially since his interpretations appeared quixotic.103 But Schliemann's hermeneutics was organised around several themes.

Consider Figure 8, an image from Schliemann's Ilios, one of dozens of similar objects illustrated in his published books and reports. Schliemann's colleagues were inclined to dismiss such artefacts as trivial, but he insisted that it is representational, the figure of an idol, which, supported by etymological histories, he attributes to the first city at Troy.104 Other pieces of what Schliemann calls debris are made to yield insights into other aspects of Homeric culture, often in striking ways. A second theme in Schliemann's work is his highly gendered, at times eroticised, interpretation of idol fragments. Where others might see a geometrical pattern, some rough cuts, perhaps a trace of design, Schliemann finds the eyes of a goddess, breasts, arms, a vulva, and other signals of female form, albeit disorganised and anatomically preposterous (Figs. 9-10). Such interpretation valencies are, and were, peculiar enough to draw comment.105

What has not been recognised is the similarity of Schliemann's interpretative techniques to those that Freud was developing in the 1890s. The recovery of fragments, their valorisation as symbols, their interpretation as rich signals of sexual life — all this ties Freud and Schliemann far more compellingly than the slackly shared master metaphor.106 Put more critically, Schliemann and Freud both succumbed to the temptation to over-interpret and even to construct 'observations' out of interpretations, and then to use such observations as the basis for theories. One notorious instance appears in Freud's 1905 case history of Dora: he first supposes that she had overheard her parents having sex and then, a few lines later, treats this supposition as fact, 'an impression she had received'.107

If Freud's reading of Schliemann was as helpful as I am arguing to his presentation of the theory of hysteria, why and how did the archaeological metaphor eventually lose its power? Freud's 1896 lecture introduced his seduction theory of hysteria — the theory that female patients, some of whose histories he reported in the lecture, had fallen ill consequent to the trauma of childhood sexual abuse. By retrieving and confronting memories of the event, Freud reported, the patients had been cured of the symptoms of their neuroses. Freud subsequently disowned this theory in favour of a version tracing hysterical symptoms to childhood fantasies of sexual abuse, the suppression of which had triggered neurosis.108 Freud did not (as some have contended) deny that sexual assaults had been committed on children, but such occurrences figured far less prominently in his work following what has been called the abandonment of his seduction theory, first privately in 1897 and then publicly (with equivocation) in 1905.109 The same can be said of the metaphor that served to introduce Freud's seduction theory. It had served him brilliantly and should have been put to rest. Instead, it reappeared in later writings rather as did the abandoned seduction theory: in odd statements lacking evident explanatory or didactic power. This is no accident, for Freud's theoretical shift necessitated a change in his approach. That is, it demanded that he alter both the method and the interpretative procedures he had introduced with his archaeological metaphor in 1896.

Freud's problem was memory: how to know whether a newly-reported memory has been retrieved, reconstructed or imposed on a patient? In a careful study of Freud's writings, Israels and Schatzman have recently attributed Freud's change of heart to an intellectual and, especially, a therapeutic impasse.110 The ease in which he could plant 'memories' of his own devising in the minds of his hysterical patients led Freud to recognise the flaws in his seduction theory. Incredibly, as Freud later recognised, not one of the patients whose cases he recounted in his 1896 lecture had actually reported sexual abuse, and none had been cured. This is astonishing because...
which were not in any useful sense buried in the first place, could have therapeutic benefit. The whole archaeological metaphor had misled him. So Freud took refuge in a mixed metaphorical idiom that offered no comfort or solace and no associations with Schliemann’s legendary verve and interpretative courage. In 1897 Freud had written gleefully to Fliess of his breakthrough in formulating his seduction theory: he described feeling like a discoverer of the Nile. Writing a year later to declare his change of heart to Fliess, Freud abandoned his archaeological allusions and Egyptian references and described feeling like a philistine in the land of Askelon, Egypt’s bitterest Biblical enemy.

Did Freud learn from this episode a more general lesson about the sometimes-false allure of metaphors and analogies? His seduction theory had been compromised by what Scharnberg has termed ‘the principle of similarity’, such that, for example, a hare-lip is caused by the pregnant mother’s having been scared by a hare, and the late emergence of a patient’s memory of seduction would be evidence that the memory had been ‘buried’, and in turn that it was true. Such an argument is essentially analogical, and one might expect that, having suffered the consequences of over-eager application of the archaeological metaphor, Freud would have become more hesitant to find similarities between apparently unconnected events and symptoms — a railroad accident and vomiting, for example — after his abandonment of the seduction theory. It would be interesting to discover whether Freud becomes more adept, more cautious or more lax in the analogical and metaphorical flourishes of his mature work.

**REINVENTING FREUD?**

Readers of Sulloway’s pioneering study of Freud will know that one of its aims is to explore how Freud and his followers colluded in the manufacture of an heroic image of the founding father of psychoanalysis. Sulloway employs a model derived from Joseph Campbell’s *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (1968), to demonstrate that Freud depicted himself in archetypally heroic terms as setting forth on a multi-stage journey from initial isolation through initiation and return, followed by rejection before finding fame.

What Sulloway and other commentators have overlooked is the role of Schliemann in providing Freud with a model of heroic selfhood. Without asserting that Schliemann was Freud’s only source for his role-modelling, it is hard to deny striking parallels in the mythologized interpretations they laid over their lives. The importance of a range of role models picked up through reading about other lives is, surprisingly, not a subject much attended to by historians. Yet, we know of several cases where nineteenth-century figures seem to have emerged, as Freud did, from the intellectual and emotional doldrums, with the help of a model of successful selfhood acquired through reading. Dr Emil Bois-Reymond, for example, a significant physiologist whose work exerted considerable influence on Freud’s early researches, was plunged into depression in 1840, brought about by doubts as to whether he would ever fulfill his scientific ambition. He viewed himself, ‘[cleft] between philosophy and the study of scientific details; between life as it is described in novels and autobiographies of famous men and reality that lies before me’.

The cardinal document in Schliemann’s own self-mythology is his autobiography, first published in 1880 at the beginning of *Ilios*. It is an absorbing and astounding text, which, to anyone already familiar with the oft-repeated myths about Freud’s path to wisdom (now documented by Sulloway) gives them a distinctly second-hand feel. Schliemann’s narrative caused havoc when it appeared, and contributed to his extraordinarily mixed and still-disputed reputation. To some he is an archaeological pioneer, a genius even, while to others he remains, despite his accomplishments, a perjurer, fraud, egoist and psychopath. One can hardly help noting the similarity

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**Fig. 9: Idol of Terra-cotta: “the eyes...are above the eyebrows, and the vulva just below the neck” from Schliemann’s Ilios, figures 195, 196.**

**Fig. 10: Fragment of an idol of Terra-cotta: “the two spirals attached to it on the right and left may represent the breasts, and the central one the vulva”, from Schliemann’s Tiryns, 1886, figure 11, p. 77.**

Freud’s lack of therapeutic success with the eighteen patients is perfectly evident from the lecture and subsequent papers. A recent study argues that Freud must not only have been aware of his failure himself, but also in all likelihood fabricated the existence of some of the patients whose tales of childhood assault he reported. Like Schliemann, Freud was making everything up as he went along: symptoms, memories and patients.
in the subsequent reputations in some quarters of both Freud and Schliemann.118

Freud was susceptible to Schliemann's writings in a superficial sense because of the similarities in their lives; each was born in a provincial town, raised in a large family, the son of an impecunious but bookish father and a doting mother, goaded to academic achievement and so forth. He was susceptible, too, because of his interest in archaeology, but principally because his sense of isolation drew him toward any paths that might offer rescue from desolation and perceived ineffectiveness.119 Freud became acquainted with Schliemann's autobiography in mid-1899; he wrote to Fliess on 28 May 1899 of having given himself Ilios as a gift and of having 'greatly enjoyed' Schliemann's account of his upbringing and childhood.120 'Enjoyment' deflects us from the real import of Freud's reading, made clear a few lines later when Freud explains to Fliess his inclinations toward the creation of what he calls, in an arresting phrase, a 'nova species mith'.121 A new species of self.

There is space here only to sketch the features of Schliemann's autobiography and other writings (all more or less autobiographical) that Freud appears to have used in his own refashioning. Freud identifies, first, with a narrative that proceeds upward from lowly obscurity to eventual fame, directed by fate. While hardly an invention of Schliemann's, Ilios gives the upward journey a key role in organising memory and experience that Freud's earliest efforts at autobiographical narrative imitate. Freud's self-styled lowly origins begin in the late 1890s to figure prominently in both his private and public writings. To Fliess in 1899, for example, he writes that he 'came to know the helplessness of poverty and continually fear it'. In the same year, he publishes an analysis of his own childhood, in the course of which his 'long and difficult years' are emphasised.122 Freud never in fact suffered poverty during his childhood, but the memories he manufactured of early despair were an important measuring-rod in the assessment of his subsequent success.123 More importantly, Freud, like Schliemann, liked to retell early prophecies of his eventual distinction. Born in a caul (a traditional portent of good upbringing and predestination), Freud records shortly after reading Ilios that a woman had announced to his mother soon after his birth that a great man had been brought into the world.124 The story is, as a recent critic has suggested, 'more than a little suspect', but its importance to Freud is beyond doubt, and he more than once harked back to this theme, to the extent of making it the predestined for fame.125 The theme is central to Schliemann's autobiography, as are classical allusions to heroic deeds and the conquest of new worlds.126 Schliemann too portrayed himself in his published writings as a lonely battler opening up new worlds, solving great historical problems, and inscribed himself in tales of heroic, generally Homeric, deeds.127

While Freud's sense of isolation in the mid- to late 1890s was genuine, it may well have been reinforced in later accounts by cues from Schliemann, who often describes himself as working in solitude, misunderstood and unrecognised for his genius.128 And, lastly, Schliemann may well have contributed to Freud's developing sense that the past could serve as a potent source of identification and renewal. Freud, like Schliemann, not only finds it easy to identify with classical heroes but also introduces historic or mythical figures into his case histories, with what is at times striking effect.129 Consider the following passage from his Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905). Freud introduces one of his interpretations with the comment that he 'had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity'. The reference to archaeology and the classical past established, Freud proceeds:

When Dora stayed with the K.'s she used to share a bedroom with Frau K., and the husband used to be quartered elsewhere. She had been the wife's confidante and adviser in all the difficulties of her married life. There was nothing they had not talked about. Medea had been quite content that Creusa should make friends with her two children; and she certainly did nothing to interfere with the relations between the girl and the children's father.130

Without interrupting the narrative for pause or parenthesis, Freud substitutes Medea for Mrs K. and Creusa for Dora.131 It seems to him quite appropriate that a mythical figure and a member of the Viennese bourgeoisie should sit side-by-side in the same case study. Perhaps for a man who daily stroked and spoke to a cast of ancient marble and bronze figurines, traffic across time and across the border between myth and fact came easily. But it was, to say the least, unconventional to invoke myth in medical case reports — Freud's teacher J.M. Charcot, for example, does not resort to such references — and does not seem merely a natural outgrowth of a classical education.132

While it was not uncommon for nineteenth-century psychiatric case studies to quote profusely from literature — their erudition is sometimes astounding — partly to emphasise their status as learned and humane works, both the introduction of Freud's citations and their nature are unusual.133 To some degree, Freud's literariness (the term is used here provisionally), expresses his ability to present a well-constructed story and thereby attain for psychoanalysis what has been termed 'narrative truth'.134 Presenting his case studies with such controlled style enabled Freud to place them in a long literary history stretching back to the oral epic tradition of the Greeks; moreover, according to Paul Ricoeur, the very facts of psychoanalysis are constituted largely by the analyst's success in entering them into a coherent story.135 So one is led to ask whether Freud's 'classical' narratives, and their prehistoric citations — indeed that troublesome confusion some have found in Freud between narrative truth and historical truth — may have been prompted, even sanctioned by his reading of Schliemann, famed for his powers of historical revivification, for making the heroes of the Iliad and the Odyssey, "men of flesh and blood".136 Another question is then raised: if Freud did indeed model his mythic self on Schliemann's, what might the consequences have been?

**TWO-WAY TRAFFIC**

Dressing in a dead man's clothes to start one's life afresh must have its unnerving moments. Like metaphors, models of selfhood have consequences: some unanticipated and unwelcome. Did Freud discover this for himself; did he, indeed, sense the paradox of his own position, its insincerity, even hypocrisy? Or was Freud's apparent self-fashioning left unanalysed, like his smoking and collecting? With such queries we find ourselves on ground largely untrodden by traditional Freud scholarship, from which it is possible only to point out some paths for further research. In addition to a properly contextual study of Freud's interests in collecting and studying archaeological and prehistoric objects, we ought surely to consider whether psychoanalysis had an impact on archaeology. Freud's metaphor certainly helped legitimise psychoanalysis, but, like any metaphor, it was a two-way street. Freud came to dismiss the capacity of any other discipline to advance the development of psychoanalysis. But was there any interchange between archaeology and psychoanalysis beyond a metaphor in common?137

One might speculate that the routines of archaeological fieldwork would have attracted psychoanalytic curiosity, perhaps as a natural progression from the more general Freudian interest in such richly connotative pursuits as digging into Mother Earth, immersion in dirt, the search for buried treasure and the lure of gold. Have archaeology and its
practitioners in fact received the attention of psychoanalytic critics and historians? Apart from a handful of specialised studies, I know of no such work.

This paper has not begun to exhaust the subject of Freud's collecting. One could easily enough (too easily?) work up a psychoanalytic interpretation of a given object — what it offers, impedes, represents and stimulates. Did Freud prize his print of the rock-cut temple at Abu Simbel, for instance, because of the closeness of 'Abu' to the Hebrew Abi ('my father') and 'Simbel' to the German and English Symbol: 'Symbol of my father?' When having the print of Freud's treatment couch a way not only to recall Jacob to life, but also to grant him superintendence over Freud's professional progress and, indeed, to reinforce again the symbiotic relation between Jewish and Egyptian identity?\textsuperscript{13} And what of those images of the Sphinx: did they connote an idealised self-image as a solver of riddles? Did they bear on Freud's formulation of the Oedipus complex? And were they a reminder of Freud's fantasies as a young man that his own bust, adorned with a line from Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, 'who divined the famed riddle of the Sphinx', would be displayed at the University of Vienna?\textsuperscript{139}

Such speculations are seductive and easily parodied.\textsuperscript{140} Of course it is impossible to verify or refute them, even were Freud alive and willing; the material that might do so always lies beyond reach in what D.W. Winnicott called the 'incommunicado element', a psychoanalytic equivalent of the fabled silence of the gods.\textsuperscript{141} What might fix such interpretations is a careful reconnexion of the broader cultural and social contexts in which Freud undertook his collecting. This would require more information than is now available on Freud's relations with dealers and friends with archaeologists and classicists, and closer attention to the impact on Freud's historical interests of his rigorous training in the Gymnasium.\textsuperscript{142} And more information on the particular characteristics collecting may have acquired in the nineteenth century. Alain Corbin has recently suggested that the dispersal of the aristocracy's objets after the French Revolution produced a vigorous buyer's market which enabled people of humble means to begin acquiring all manner of artefacts previously beyond their purse (Balzac's Cousin Pons would be one such). By the mid-century, Corbin notes, collecting 'became fashionable' and the trade in antiques firmly established to serve the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie. It would be good to know precisely what role collecting was then in a position to perform, and Corbin, in a typical flourish of speculation, suggests that late nineteenth-century collectors found in their hobby a refuge from the buzz and hum of public culture, narcissistic equivalents of the self, a retreat to norms of domesticity and isolation, and check and control for the libido.\textsuperscript{143} All of which leaves us tantalisingly close to some intriguing connections between memory, collecting and Freudian psychoanalysis.

Doubtless, the best route to an understanding of individual memory is collective memory, and the best route to collective memory is contextual memory. Is it possible that the historical recovery of cultural contexts may not only yield the best insights into developments in late nineteenth century psychoanalysis and archaeology, but also provide a means of escape from the False Memory Society?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I should like to thank Doris McIlwain and John Sutton, each of whom provided extensive and exceedingly useful comments on an early draft of this essay. Their suggestions are too far-reaching for me to be able to deal with in my article, or in footnotes, and call for further research in several areas only touched on briefly here. In subsequent work I hope to be able to present a more thorough-going account of Heinrich Schillemann and his importance to Freud, and to deal more extensively with the social context of collecting, a theme central to The Cultures of Collecting, edited by John Elsner and Roger Cardinal (Melbourne University Press, 1994), which appeared after this essay had been submitted for publication. I am most grateful to Ann Goodsell and Shari Lee for helping to improve the style and overall design of this article.

NOTES
1. This information derives from the reports, originally published in the UK and US, appearing in the Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1994 and in the Times Higher Education Supplement, 20 May 1994. Ian Hacking (1994) opens his study of 'memoro-politics', as I do here, with a reference to well-publicised cases of 'false' memories of sexual abuse.

2. In the latest effort, an international conference at the Freud Museum, London, took place in June 1994 devoted to 'Memory, the Question of Archives'.


6. Masson 1985: 61. Like many other addicts, Freud no sooner gave up smoking than he took up talking and writing interminably about his self denial; see Masson 1985:63, 86-88, 132-33, 172, 205, 404, for instances.


13. Freud to Fliess, 22 June 1894, in Masson 1985:54. Freud went to great lengths to keep his discovery of a leukoplastic growth on his jaw and palate secret from his physician (and from his friends), afraid that he would order him to give up smoking. See Gay 1988:418-19.

14. Schur 1972:247. Freud was in the habit of comparing his attachment to things and pursuits to his cigars: when his pet chow was killed in an accident, for example, he wrote at a time when he was medically unfit to smoke, of missing him "almost as much as my cigar": Freud to Lou Andreas-Salomé, 8 May 1930, in Pfeiffer 1971:188.

15. With my study of 1987, I plead guilty to exhuming a piece of Freudian trivia of my own.

16. Gamwell & Wells 1989. This volume, while attractive and stimulating, leaves several problems unresolved. It provides no listing of the pictures in Freud's collection, referring merely to prints owned by Freud 'many of which depict archaeological sites' (Gamwell 1989:31, n. 31), nor does it differentiate between those artefacts selected and purchased by Freud and those given to him as gifts. Moreover, the fascinating list of archaeological books provided at the end of the volume does not include
Freud’s books on ancient history and Greek (for which Trosman and Simmons 1973 is useful). Bernfeld 1951, while of considerable interest, overinterprets the evidence then available. The work of Heinz and Carina Weiss 1984, 1985, 1989 therefore remains an essential supplement to Gamwell and Wells, particularly since it provides a far fuller account of Freud’s collection and its development. Noteworthy, too, is Tögel 1989, with its meticulous account of Freud’s travels, including his trips to Rome and other classical sites. Price 1992 is an excellent, all too brief guide to the documentary problems, and I have used it for this note.


Freud to Josef Breuer, 7 January 1898, in Freud 1970:244; Jobst 1978: 47. Although Freud’s partiality may seem to us callous, particularly when he was so stretched looking after his wife and six children, Gamwell’s study reveals that the prices Freud paid for his acquisitions were surprisingly low, principally because the objects that attracted him were unfashionable; Gamwell 1989:23.

Jones 1953-57, II:58.

‘This betrays the questing spirit of the collector’, Freud writes; Freud 1953-74, VII:110 (hereafter cited as SE, volume: pages).

The wait was, as his biographer Peter Gay has written, ‘almost too much to bear’. Gay 1989:15.

That is, RM 400; Gay 1990:175-76.

Jones 1950; Abraham 1966; Fenichel 1945; Ferenzci 1950.

SE IX:169-75.

Fisher and Greenberg 1977:143-44.

Freud’s ‘anal type’, one notes, emphasises the importance of ordering.

One thinks in this context of recent work on cognitive mapping and mental geography: Downs and Stea 1977, and Gould and White 1986, for example.

James 1890 2:422-27. For further insights, see Baudrillard 1968 and Stewart 1993.

Rigby 1944:315.

Whipp and Blackmore 1977. The power sought by Freud through his collecting was not, as Gay supposes, that which comes from acquiring a complete set of objects. Gay 1989:18.

Brill 1913:211. Having noted the resemblance of the mushroom to a penis, and the woman’s loneliness, an account fell readily into place — ‘Phallus is the scientific name for some species of mushroom’, Brill added helpfully.

For details, see Rigby 1944:76, 239-42. When Pepys died, he willed his library to Magdalene College, Cambridge, under very strict instructions that its order should be preserved. A delegation of vigilant inspectors from Trinity College was, according to Pepys’ commands, to visit Magdalene once a year for a thorough investigation of the collection. If so much as one book were out of place or any intruder were found among the pristine volumes, the entire library would be transferred to Trinity!

Recent work on the culture of consumption has suggested the variety of messages conveyed by the presentation of accumulated goods of various kinds, and, in the process, revealed how inadequately conceptualised the symbolism and significance of consumption are. For an excellent series of essays, Brewer and Porter 1993.

Sachs 1945:153. For information on Freud’s gift of gold coins to Arnold Zweig, see Zweig’s letter to Freud, 2 March 1969, in Freud and Zweig 1968:134; Freud’s ‘secret ring’ is the subject of Grosskurth 1991 (pages 17 and 57 discuss the objects Freud gave to the members of the committee). I avoid the temptation to link Freud’s gifts with his smoking, a temptation not resisted by Jacques Derrida 1994: 108-15, who would, I gather from his rambling remarks, find the ash on the tip of Freud’s cigar symbolic of the work of mourning, and memory too (112) — and why not?

Jobst 1978:48 claims that Freud prepared a catalogue of his collection in 1914 and cites as evidence a letter from Freud to Karl Abraham. In fact, Freud in his letter, dated 25 August 1914, refers to Otto Rank’s ‘putting in order and cataloguing my library’ and does not refer to his collection. Abraham and Freud 1965:186.


In part, the problems arise because of incomplete or contradictory published evidence. For example, only a tiny fraction of Freud’s letters to his family in relation to his travels has been published Tögel 1989:16. For other documentary problems, see footnote 16 above.

Muensterberger 1993.

Freud described his reaction to the death of his father in 1908 as ‘the most significant event, the most poignant loss, of a man’s life’. SE II:xxvi.


Homans 1989. A far more contentious, but nevertheless fascinating, suggestion is made by Kripp 1987, that Freud abandoned the seduction theory on 25 October 1896, at his father’s funeral, at the moment when he was able to deny to himself that his own father had sexually abused him.
47. There are dozens of studies devoted to Freud's Jewish identity, amongst which Klein 1981; Hessing 1989; Robert 1977; Bergmann 1976; Loewenberg 1971; Yerushalmi 1991 and Gilman 1993 are noteworthy. McGrath 1991 offers a useful summary of the various readings.

48. Only five of several hundred Viennese dealers sold only antiquities, and of fifty-two private collections catalogued in Vienna in 1908, only six included antiquities. Gamwell 1989:29n.9.

49. As Yerushalmi 1991:111-12, points out, somewhat to his surprise Freud did have in his collection a very small number of specifically Jewish objects: a Menora, an etching of Rembrandt's 'The Synagogue', two Kiddush cups, and a few other items.


51. It was in 1922 that Freud wrote to Ferenczi that as he studied his prized possessions, 'strange secret yearnings perhaps of my ancestral heritage — for the East and the Mediterranean' stirred in him. Gay 1988:172.

52. See Tögel 1989:116; Bernfeld 1951:110. Freud's personal investment in Egyptian artefacts and history is suggested also in his peculiar failure to mention Abraham's 1912 paper on Amenhotep IV in his own studies of ancient Egypt. See Shengold 1972.

53. SE IX:237-41. The equation between Freud's denial of his own Judaism and enacting the family romance is confused by the fact that Jewish affiliation is passed down through the mother.


56. SE XX:273.

57. Masson 1984. Freud's sense of isolation manifestly predates the reception given to his lecture on 21 April 1896: in a typical complaint to Fliess, dated 16 March 1896, Freud speaks of the hostility and isolation surrounding him (Masson 1985:179). As Robinson (1993:113) points out, Masson tries to shape the evidence to fit his hypothesis that Freud gave up his seduction theory after his setback on 21 April by grouping the correspondence of Freud and Fliess together after this date under the sectional heading 'Isolation from the Scientific Community'. Interestingly, Masson holds his own account of Freud's reception into his subsequent narrative recounting his, Masson's, presentation of his thesis about Freud's abandonment of his seduction theory. So Masson speaks (in ways that recall Freud's account to Fliess of the icy reception of his 1896 lecture) of the 'deathly silence' that followed his talk in 1981, and of his sense of being 'completely isolated' afterwards. See Masson 1990:190, 192.

58. Sulloway (1980:478n.23) accepts that Freud's isolation during these years was 'partially self-imposed', which suggests that it was real enough. Some of the sources Sulloway cites in support of his own rebuttals of the myth of Freud's actual isolation appear not in fact to provide evidence bearing on the topic. Roazen 1975: 195-97, 288, for example, is one of Sulloway's sources, but, at least on the pages cited (Sulloway refers to the 1975 US edition, as well as to the 1976 English edition, which I have used) Roazen does not treat the matter. Elsewhere he simply suggests that Freud 'emphasized his isolation because, fundamentally, he liked it' (209) and asserts without citing evidence that Freud 'glorified, and indeed exaggerated, his isolation in the 1890s' (295).

59. In what is symptomatic of a conflation of the actuality of the reception of the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) with Freud's experience of it, Sulloway adds up the published contemporary reviews of the book and notes that 'the aggregate number of notices now stands closer to forty' than to the number suggested by the myth of isolation. Subsequently, Sulloway notes that Freud in fact 'definitely knew of seven reviews', the majority of which were short notices. Sulloway 1980:450, 452. On isolation as Freud's psychological reality, see Robinson 1993:92. Freud, one notes, seems to have recognised that his sense of isolation was largely a delusion, speaking at one point of his reference to his own, suffering, perhaps from a species of 'paranoia scientifica'. Freud recounted in An Autobiographical Study (1925) that '[for] more than ten years after my separation from Breuer I had no followers. I was completely isolated'. This was certainly his perception from the mid-1890s, admitted even by those who dispute its truth in fact. SE XX:48. Ellenberger writes that one of the features of Freud's letters to Fliess during the mid to late 1890s was 'the characteristic feeling of utter isolation', adding that 'there is no evidence that Freud was really isolated (my emphasis).'(1970:448).

60. Gardner 1972:139.

61. SE X:176.


64. Whyte 1979 is one of several studies tracing the development of the concept of the unconscious well before Freud.

65. See Ziolkowski 1990:18-63. Freud's best known use of the image of a descent into the underworld of darkness before emergence into the light occurs in the final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams. Some of the cultural resonances of nineteenth-century geology and other depth sciences are examined in Shortland 1994.

66. See on this Nordon 1966;246. Freud's links with Holmes have been explored in Shepherd 1984 and During 1993.


70. Young 1985.


73. SE XI:17; Rieff 1965:42. One might add that in recovering and interpreting buried memories, the analyst is not in the position of the archaeologist who can

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supplement the material evidence available with the testimony of witnesses; relevant here are the remarks of John Boswell 1988:5-6 on the analogy between geology and history.

74. Janet Malcolm makes (or rather, suggests) an interesting point, that Freud's initially 'hard-edged' metaphor for the analyst, while plausible for a short course of therapy, would have seemed strained for a lengthy treatment. The surgeon, soldier and archaeologist work quickly, as did Freud at the outset of his career as an analyst: by the 1920s, analysis could last up to a year, while nowadays it can stretch across decades. Malcolm 1993:51.

75. Campbell 1920:129.

76. SE II:139, 134, 305.

77. See SE III:151.

78. The lecture was 'The Aetiology of Hysteria', delivered before the Verein für Psychiatrie und Neurologie (SE III:191-221). The effect of the reception of Freud's lecture was profound and he subsequently recalled the meeting with bitterness and referred to its contributing to 'the void which formed itself about me'. SE XIV:21.


80. SE III:192.

81. SE III:192.

82. Freud to Fliess, 26 April 1896, in Masson 1985:184. Interestingly, when Freud's method yielded major results three years later he seems to have recalled Krafft-Ebing's remarks. He described his successes by reference to the archaeological discovery of Troy, which had, he says, 'hitherto been deemed a fable', Freud to Fliess, 21 December 1899, in Masson 1985:392.

83. SE III:196.

84. SE XXI:70.

85. SE XXIII:260.


88. As Rodiger 1980 points out, Freud's comparison of memory to a house has several similarities to that presented in William James's Principles of Psychology, as well as to earlier (and subsequent) spatial metaphors. One might add that Sherlock Holmes presents Dr Watson (in Study in Scarlet, during the early stages of their acquaintance) with a very similar model to explain how he stores and retrieves memories from his 'brain attic'; Yates 1966 provides many similar models drawn from the Renaissance art of memory, De arte memorativa.

89. SE XVI:295-97.

90. Spence 1982:289 claims that these lectures were delivered 'at a time when Freud was convinced of the truth of the archaeological model', a statement which I find baffling and for which Spence provides no documentary support. Several examples of Freud's use of the model in lectures appear in the journal of Lou Andreas-Salomé 1987.

91. SE 18:60


93. SE V:536. Brunner 1994:87-88 has a brief, but lucid, presentation of these sources, which I have drawn on.

94. There exists no reliable and comprehensive biography of Schliemann, but much valuable material is available in Ludwig 1931, while Daniel 1978:136-45 provides a brief account of Schliemann's work and reputation. Schliemann's fame is one of the themes of Stone's 'biographical novel of Henry and Sophia Schliemann', Stone 1975. Ludwig and Stone each also wrote biographies of Freud, suggesting in the process, perhaps, some links in their subjects' lives.

95. Peter Gay, for example, has drawn attention in several places to Freud's admiration for Schliemann, 'the man whom he seems to have envied most', (1987:52), but without analysing the significance of this. See also Gay 1988:172.

96. I know of no information as to when Freud acquired and read these volumes; certainly, there is nothing to support Gamwell's claim that Freud first read a scholarly account of an archaeological excavation in 1899, when he purchased Illos. Gamwell 1989:22.

97. See for example Schliemann 1878:xli, 10. 'Schliemann', a critic wrote in 1908, 'was absolutely ignorant of any kind of scientific method ... He was a dilettante without method or knowledge ... without the slightest idea that there existed proper methods and techniques for excavation'. Quoted in Döhl 1986:96. References abound in his own writings to Schliemann's laborious excavating, his dawn-to-dusk digging and hard work. See, for example, Schliemann 1875:275, 301, 357; 1880:660-62, 665; Ludwig 1931:180.

98. When Schliemann exhibited his Trojan treasures in London, Müller helped him arrange things. He found that artefacts from the four different strata that Schliemann considered he had discovered at Troy in wild confusion. One day, when Müller was busy unpacking a case of the lowest stratum, he found a piece of pottery from the highest. 'Que voulez-vous', said Schliemann, 'it has tumbled down!' Not long afterwards, in a box of the highest stratum appeared a piece of the rough pottery from the lowest. 'Que voulez-vous,' said the unperturbable Schliemann, 'it has tumbled up'. Cited in Calder 1986:35. The image of the archaeologist as a rugged, ditch-digging, machismo figure, which perhaps has its origins in Schliemann's self-portrayal, remains a subject of criticism today; see Woodall & Perricone 1981 (the archaeologist as cowboy); Kelley & Hanen 1988 (the archaeologist as boy scout); and Gero 1988.

99. Virchow in Schliemann 1880:ix (my emphasis). The notion that analysis and archaeology can be validated by results 'in the field' rather than metatheories still seems to find supporters in archaeology, see Kelley & Hanen 1988:375.

100. For a recent critique of archaeology's lack of theory and overwhelming emphasis on data accumulation rather than interpretation, see Tilley 1989.

101. Schliemann 1875:13; 1878:14, 33. Schliemann's passion for 'débris' is clear from his lyrical invocation of the term: nine times in two pages (22-23), 15 times in four pages (22-25) in Schliemann 1884. On Schliemann as one of the pioneers who 'preserved everything he found', see Daniel 1978:169.

103. For examples, see Levine 1986:33-34; see Schliemann 1880:213, 448.

104. It is an idol because Schliemann believes that even in its earliest states, Homeric Troy was a civilisation, with a culture of beliefs and its legacy of idols; Schliemann 1880:233. Schliemann’s account is based on etymological and linguistic resemblances and appears in several of his writings. See Schliemann 1875:35-37, 113; 1880:282, 287-88; 1886:164-65. I take this opportunity of thanking Dr Alan James, a classicist at the University of Sydney, for answering my queries concerning Schliemann’s etymological deductions.

105. Schliemann’s to say the least unusual attitudes towards women and the female body have not, to my knowledge, received attention but are the subject of on-going research of mine.

106. Another source for Freud’s readings of symbols and evidence is interpretative tradition of Rabbinic Judaism, on which see Frieden 1990.

107. SE VII:79-80. Scharnberg 1993 deals with this example in several places in his study (describing it on page 93 and subsequently as ‘unambiguously faked’), but for all his accusations of sloppiness, and worse, directed at Freud, he himself reports Freud as supposing that Dora ‘spied upon her parents having sexual intercourse’, (1993:26). Dora did not see, but rather heard, her parents. What is most striking about Freud’s Dora is that it is in this report that he speaks of proceeding ‘like a conscientious archaeologist’. He writes: ‘In face of the incompleteness of my analytic results, I had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity. I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses; but, like the conscientious archaeologist, I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my constructions begin’, SE VII:12. Another instance of what Spence (1982:117) has termed ‘the perils of active listening’, occurs in the Wolf Man case, which has been very interestingly explored in Jacobsen and Steele 1979, who, amongst other things, show the persistence of the archaeological metaphor in this case as well as its ineffectiveness, an interpretation congenial to my own.


109. Freud’s public (as opposed to private) renunciation of the seduction theory appears in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 1905; on his references to the theory after his renunciation, see Izenberg 1991:41 and Cummings 1991:47-49.

110. Israelis and Schatzman 1993. According to Masson 1984, Freud abandoned his own seduction theory not because he recognised the difficulty of retrieving memories of abuse but because of his own moral cowardice in pursuing a theory which seemed to accuse so many adult males of complicity in sexual abuse. The recent studies of Robinson 1993 and Porter 1994 have exposed several problems with Masson’s account.

111. Scharnberg 1993.


113. Scharnberg does not deal in his 1993 study with the literary and rhetorical techniques Freud uses to make his arguments persuasive, nor with Freud’s twentieth-century writings, subjects apparently for future volumes.


115. Some remarks on the coincidence of Freud’s and Schliemann’s interests appear in Niederland 1989, while Schöenau 1968 suggests that Freud identified both with the biblical Joseph and with Schliemann. Niederland refers in his article to ‘Freud’s enthusiasm for Heinrich Schliemann in adolescence’, citing another article for further information on this improbably early enthusiasm. Puzzlingly, the article in question, Niederland 1981, has no discussion of Freud and Schliemann at all and certainly does not, as Niederland states, (1989:70), give ‘special weight’ to the relationship.


117. For a sample of the widely varying opinions of Schliemann’s worth and character, see Calder 1972; Schindler 1976; Traill 1986; and Dohl 1986.

118. For two examples of attacks on Freud for dishonesty, guile and plagiarism, see Cioffi, 1979 and Crews 1986:19-111. Crews (1994:63) has recently denounced those erstwhile critics of Freud who ignore his ‘brazenly mendacious claims’.

119. Such susceptibility is not revealed in Freud’s own autobiography, a late piece of writing, prepared for professional purposes when he was seventy and which, Freud claimed dealt with ‘no personal experiences…of any interest in comparison to my relations with [psycho-analysis]’. SE XX:71.

120. Freud to Fliess, 28 May 1899, in Masson 1985:353.


123. For varying estimates of the Freud family finances during Sigmund’s youth, see Bernfeld 1951:114; Gay 1988:8-9; Isbister 1985:17-18, 20.

124. SE IV:192.


126. Freud’s motto for The Interpretation of Dreams is chosen from Virgil: ‘If Heaven I can not bend, then Hell I will arouse’; SE IV:x.

127. See, for examples, Schliemann 1875:12, 22, 216.


129. For one example of Freud’s identification, in this instance with Hannibal, see SE IV:197; Schliemann’s autobiography offers many such examples, see 1880:1-7.

130. SE VII:12, 61.

131. See, on this, Bernfeld 1951:108.

132. The contemporary case studies collected in Masson 1986 reveal no similar introduction of material from classical or archaeological history.
133. Pratt 1994 offers an interesting study of the manifold appropriations of literature in Victorian psychiatry, while Cummins 1991 emphasises the reliance of psychoanalysis on literary works. The breadth of interest and erudition of Freud's circle is remarkable: Otto Rank's recently translated study of *The Incest Theme in Literature and Legend* (first published in 1912), for example, includes in its text material in classical Greek, Latin, old French and modern French, Italian and Spanish, all untranslated (Rank 1992). When the book was published, Rank was just twenty-two years old.

134. On this see Spence 1982.


136. Schliemann 1884:x.

137. See, for example, SE XX:158-82.


139. Jones 1953-57, II:15. Freud explores some of the emotional bonds he had developed with objects in his collection in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901); SE VI:167-70; see also Freud's remarks in SE XVII:147-49.

140. An (undoubtedly unintentional) parody of a psychoanalytic reading of Freud's arrangement of images over his couch is offered in Dimock 1994; in a series of wild leaps, Dimock supposes that the images and the way Freud hung them on his wall articulate some fundamental aspects of psychoanalysis. While it is noted in passing, the presumably richly significant fact that Freud completely changed the arrangement over his couch when he moved from Vienna to London is not explored by Dimock.


142. It was in his contribution to a Festschrift for his Gymnasium in Vienna (the Leopoldstädtler Kommunalreal und Obergymnasium) that Freud wrote in 1914 that he had there caught 'my first glimpses of an extinct civilization which in my case was to bring me as much consolation as anything else in the struggles of life'. SE XIII:241.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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